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Excessive Force in the New York City Jails: 
Litigation and Its Lessons  
John Boston* 
INTRODUCTION 
The New York City Legal Aid Society, through its Prisoners’ 
Rights Project (PRP),1 has fought since PRP’s founding in 1971 to 
protect the human rights of prisoners. In particular, we have wrestled 
with the problem of excessive force by New York City jail staff 
through individual and class action litigation2 and through 
investigations and demands for administrative redress on behalf of 
injured prisoners. Our focus has been on reforming the systems that 
operate to control force in correctional settings including written 
policy, training, investigations, discipline, and supervision of staff.  
The single most important lesson we have taken from twenty 
years of litigation is that the controlling force in jails and prisons is a 
function of correctional leadership. When supervisory staff make a 
visible, demonstrable commitment to curb misuse of force and hold 
staff accountable, inmates will not get brutalized. When correction 
supervisors turn a blind eye toward misconduct by condoning 
 
 * Project Director, Prisoners’ Rights Project, New York City Legal Aid Society. This 
testimony was prepared in collaboration with my colleagues Jonathan Chasan, Mary Lynne 
Werlwas, and Betsy Ginsberg for the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons 
for the hearing held in Tampa, Florida on April 20, 2005. 
 1. See generally Criminal Defense Practice, http://www.legal-aid.org/index.htm (follow 
“Practice Areas—The Criminal Defense Practice” hyperlink; then follow “Prisoners’ Rights 
Project” hyperlink). 
 2. See Ingles v. Toro (Ingles 2006), 438 F. Supp. 2d 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (approving 
settlement in a  city-wide class action lawsuit challenging the use of excessive force); Valvano 
v. McGrath, 325 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (prohibiting intimidation of witnesses in a case 
challenging abuse of prisoners at Queens House of Detention); Martinez v. Robinson, No. 99 
Civ. 11911, 2002 WL 424680 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2002) (addressing procedural and discovery 
issues in individual damage claims based on jail beatings). 
 In recent years we have prevailed in four class action lawsuits challenging the use of 
excessive force in the jail system, and we have recently settled a fifth. See infra note 8. 
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excessive force, overlooking false reports, and imposing inadequate 
punishment when brutality is identified, they send a signal to line 
staff that they can control troublesome, disruptive or defiant prisoners 
simply by beating them.  
EXCESSIVE FORCE IN AMERICAN PRISONS AND JAILS 
Publicity about the abuses of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in 
Iraq prompted the obvious question: does it happen in the United 
States as well? The answer is yes, though usually in less bizarre 
forms.3 Most incidents of excessive force fall into several familiar 
patterns, usually related to actual or perceived challenges to staff 
authority. These include: 
? Mass reprisals for a disruption or disturbance in prison 
activities. The best known incident of such mass reprisals 
occurred after the violent retaking at Attica Correctional 
Facility in 1971.4 Such incidents are recurrent if not 
frequent; for example, there has been more than one 
instance of gauntlet beatings of prisoners—a tool utilized in 
the Attica reprisals—in the New York City jails,5 as well as 
more localized reprisal incidents.6 
 
 3. Sometimes, however, the level of physical abuse and degradation is nothing short of 
stunning. See, e.g., Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 602–03 (6th Cir. 1986) (officer waved a 
knife in a paraplegic prisoner’s face, extorted cookies and potato chips from him at knife-point, 
and left him lying in his own waste); Oses v. Fair, 739 F. Supp. 707, 709 (D. Mass. 1990) 
(correction officer placed a revolver in a prisoner’s mouth, cocked it, and made the prisoner kiss 
his wife’s shoes after the prisoner spread a scurrilous rumor about her). 
 4. See generally ATTICA: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL 
COMMISSION ON ATTICA (Bantam ed. 1972). See id. chs. 18–19 (regarding reprisals). 
 5. In 1990 corrections officers aggrieved by an inmate assault on an officer and by court-
ordered revisions in the city’s use of force policy seized and occupied the only access point 
from land to Rikers Island. See N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF INVESTIGATION, REPORT TO THE MAYOR: 
THE DISTURBANCE AT THE RIKERS ISLAND OTIS BANTUM CORRECTIONAL CENTER, AUGUST 
14, 1990: ITS CAUSES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION RESPONSE (1991) [hereinafter 
OBCC REPORT]. As the occupation ended, there was a disturbance in one of the jails; officers 
who reported to that jail engaged in gauntlet beatings of prisoners. Id. at 205 n.196. A few years 
earlier, correction officers at Rikers engaged in gauntlet beatings of prisoners transferred from 
one jail to another after a disturbance. Fisher v. Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519, 1536–37 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), injunction entered, 718 F. Supp. 1111 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 902 F.2d 2 (2d 
Cir. 1990). 
 6. An example of a smaller-scale reprisal can be seen in the case of Jamal Butler, a 
named plaintiff in PRP’s recently settled class action lawsuit concerning the use of excessive 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/13
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? Individualized reprisals against prisoners who are deemed, 
correctly or not, to have disrupted operations or behaved 
disrespectfully toward staff.7 In some such instances there 
may have been a need for force initially, but at some later 
time, after the need for force had passed, the prisoner was 
subjected to retaliatory assault.8 In other cases prisoners 
 
force to control prisoners in a New York City jail housing unit who shouted at staff when they 
were beating a prisoner. A “response team” was dispatched to the unit and sprayed the prisoners 
indiscriminately with pepper spray and then entered the unit, swinging batons and striking 
prisoners. Mr. Butler was thrown to the floor and struck with batons, then choked by an officer 
with a tee-shirt, and beaten further before being taken to the jail intake area. About an hour 
later, members of the Department of Correction’s Emergency Response Unit entered the cells 
where Butler and other prisoners who had been removed from the housing unit were being held 
and punched and kicked them, dragging Butler from under a bench to do so. This second 
incident went entirely unreported, in violation of the city’s policy that all uses of force must be 
reported in detail. Following the assault, Mr. Butler was found to have head lacerations, ligature 
marks (an injury caused by strangling), and multiple contusions with edema; he was sent to a 
hospital emergency room for suturing. Fourth Amended Complaint at paras. 96–103, Ingles v. 
Toro, No. 01 Civ. 8279 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Mr. Butler’s claim in Ingles was resolved with a 
monetary settlement. Ingles 2006, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 210 n.3 (noting settlement of all damages 
claims). 
 This incident is similar to one documented in an earlier Rikers Island use of force trial in 
which a squad of officers came to a housing unit where prisoners had been making noise after 
lights out and threw numerous prisoners out of bed. Prisoner Rory Hartley, who was not even 
present during the disruptions that had occurred earlier in the day, was beaten and kicked by 
several officers and sustained a facial fracture. Fisher, 692 F. Supp. at 1533–34. 
 7. A recent example is Jackson v. Austin, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1313 (D. Kan. 2003), in which 
a sixty-year-old prisoner with a knee injury was sitting in the prison clinic rather than standing 
in the medication line as required by prison policy. Id. at 1316. An officer told the prisoner to 
stand up, refused to look at his medical excuse, and then (with other officers) took the prisoner 
to the floor, reinjuring the prisoner’s knee in the take down. Id. at 1317. The officers dragged 
the prisoner by his arms about fifty yards and handcuffed him so tightly his hands swelled. Id.; 
see also United States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886, 890–91, 895–96 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming 
criminal civil rights conviction of an officer where a prisoner behaved disruptively and 
disobediently in the prison dining hall, and was removed from the area and beaten while in 
handcuffs by several officers; also noting evidence that a superior officer orchestrated a cover-
up by directing officers to file false reports and directing one officer to punch himself in the 
face to support a claim that the prisoner had assaulted him). 
 8. The Supreme Court’s leading case on excessive force in prisons, Hudson v. 
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), is instructive. In that case the prisoner stated that he had an 
argument with a staff member. Id. at 4. As he was being escorted, handcuffed and shackled, the 
officer punched him in “the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach” while another officer held him 
from behind and “kicked and punched him.” Id. A supervisor watched the beating and told the 
officers “‘not to have too much fun.’” Id. Mr. Hudson suffered bruises and swelling of the face, 
mouth, and lip; loosened teeth; and cracked his partial dental plate. Id. After trial, a federal 
court found that force had been used unnecessarily and awarded damages. Id.  
 An even more horrifying example is Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 751–53 
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were beaten simply for complaining about conditions or 
denial of services.9 We have received many complaints 
from prisoners in New York City jails who have been taken 
to holding pens after disputes with staff members and have 
later been subjected to retaliatory beating in the holding pen 
area. Prisoners with mental illnesses are especially at risk 
for such treatment if their illnesses lead them to act 
aggressively or offensively.10 
? Excessive force in controlling violent conduct by 
prisoners.11 
 
(7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2915 (2005), in which a recently arrested detainee who 
had provoked a confrontation through verbal abuse while in a jail’s “drunk tank” was pepper 
sprayed, had his head smashed against walls (first in his cell and later in a shower room), and 
was then shackled in a restraint chair where he was further beaten and pepper sprayed. Id. at 
751–53. He was found unconscious by staff on the next shift and was returned to the drunk 
tank, where he died of a subdural hematoma. Id. at 753. 
 9. For example, in Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2003), a diabetic 
traffic offender persisted in complaining that he needed food to avoid illness; as a result of his 
persistence he stated that he was thrown to the ground and kicked, punched, poked with batons, 
and pepper sprayed. Id. at 412. This behavior continued after he was taken to a medical 
observation cell. Id. The officers denied kicking him or striking him with batons, alleging they 
only used enough force to curb his violent resistance. Id. at 413. However, he was later found to 
have a variety of injuries including a perforated eardrum and three fractured ribs. Id. at 412.  
 Similarly, Thomas Pizzuto, a misdemeanant held in the Nassau County Correctional Center 
in Long Island, was brutally beaten in his cell by several officers, while others looked on, after 
he loudly demanded his court-ordered methadone treatment. Pizzuto v. County of Nassau, 239 
F. Supp. 2d 301, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). A supervisor prepared a report saying he had fallen in 
the shower. Id. at 307. Five days later he died of a ruptured spleen. Id. 
 10. For example, Shawn Davis, a named plaintiff in PRP’s recently settled class action 
lawsuit about systemwide excessive force, alleged that in May 2002 he became upset because 
he was not provided his psychiatric medication and threw a plastic chair on his housing unit. He 
was subdued and handcuffed by correctional staff. He was then taken to a receiving room cell 
where officers repeatedly struck him in the face and body, knocking him to the floor, and an 
officer gratuitously kicked him in the eye, rupturing his eyeball. Fourth Amended Complaint, 
supra note 6, paras. 58–64. The Department of Correction commenced an investigation, which 
the Department of Investigation then took over. However, the investigation remains pending 
more than three years later. Mr. Davis’s claim was resolved with a monetary settlement. Ingles 
2006, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 210 n.3. Similarly, in United States v. Donnelly, 370 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 
2004), a corrections officer pleaded guilty to criminal charges of violating the civil rights of 
prisoners by beating a prisoner who engaged in verbal misconduct stemming from his 
Tourette’s syndrome, among other unconstitutional acts. Id. at 89. 
 11. See, e.g., Sikes v. Gaytan, 218 F.3d 491, 492 (5th Cir. 2000) (in which a prisoner 
proved to a jury that after an altercation in which he spit in a guard’s face, the guard took him to 
the ground, punched him in the face five or six times, and jumped up and down on his arm 
causing a dislocated left shoulder, injuries to his left elbow, conjunctival hemorrhaging to his 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/13
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? Excessive or unnecessary force in suppressing disobedient 
but nonviolent conduct.12 
A closely related phenomenon is the abuse of restraining devices for 
punitive purposes or in a punitive manner. Examples include the 
Alabama “hitching post” practice recently held unconstitutional by 
the Supreme Court13 and the New York City restraint policy, recently 
modified in the face of pending litigation.14 
 
left eye, loss of vision in his left eye, and severe bruising and lacerations to his face); see also 
Orwat v. Maloney, 360 F. Supp. 2d 146, 151, 154 (D. Mass. 2005) (rejecting the claims of the 
defendant officer who stated that he had acted in self-defense by breaking a prisoner’s jaw, 
which required surgery and several weeks in the prison infirmary, because the plaintiff had 
thrust his finger in the officer’s face). 
 12. See Jackson v. Johnson, 118 F. Supp. 2d 278 (N.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d in part and 
appeal dismissed in part, 13 F. App’x 51 (2d Cir. 2001). In Jackson, an incarcerated juvenile 
delinquent went to the bathroom without an escort and was then confronted by staff; after he 
“balled his fists and glared,” several of them “initiated a physical restraint technique” and 
continued it for twenty minutes after he lost consciousness. Id. at 283. Staff utilized this 
technique a second time when the prisoner seemed to be disobeying instructions about clearing 
a food tray. Id. at 285. Because of these attacks he was permanently mentally and physically 
injured. Id.; see also Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1268–72 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding a 
factual question of unconstitutional force was presented by evidence that the seventeen-year-old 
plaintiff, who engaged in deranged behavior including drinking toilet water and spitting it at 
officers, was subdued in his cell by officers who continued to place their weight on his back 
after he was subdued, asphyxiating him).  
 In the New York City jails, there are recurrent incidents in which “force [is] used as a first 
resort in reaction to any inmate behavior that might possibly be interpreted as aggressive. . . .” 
Fisher v. Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519, 1538 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), injunction entered, 718 F. Supp. 
1111 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 902 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1990).  Recent examples, cited in the recently 
concluded Ingles litigation, include: 
• an inmate “took a couple of steps” toward an officer “in a threatening manner” 
and the officer punched him; 
• a mentally impaired prisoner tried to “push past” an officer to use the clinic 
bathroom; the officer responded by striking the inmate multiple times in the face and 
body; 
• a prisoner was “taunting” a correctional officer, who responded by delivering 
multiple blows to the prisoner’s face; 
• a prisoner was observed striking his head against a bathroom stall door; an officer 
entered the holding pen and told him to stop; the inmate advanced towards the officer 
who then “delivered several punches to the inmate’s head and body.” 
Report of Plaintiff’s Expert, Steve J. Martin at 18–26, Ingles v. Toro, No. 01 Civ. 8279 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2004). 
 13. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), remanded by 304 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2002).  
 14. New York jail officials began in the mid-1990s to require any prisoner with a record 
of the use or possession of a weapon in jail to wear leg irons, handcuffs affixed to a waist chain, 
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EXCESSIVE FORCE AND THE CONSTITUTION 
The constitutional standards for use of force in prisons and jails 
grant wide latitude to corrections officers. It has long been 
acknowledged that “not every push or shove, even if it may later 
seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a 
prisoner's constitutional rights.”15 More recently, the Supreme Court 
has held that excessive or unnecessary force by prison staff only 
violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment16 “[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically 
use force to cause harm.”17 De minimis force, therefore, does not 
violate the Eighth Amendment.18 However, if malicious and sadistic 
intent19 is established serious injury need not be shown to constitute a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.20 
 
and “security mitts” (flexible tubes that covered the hands and prevented the prisoner from 
picking up or manipulating objects). Such prisoners were also to be handcuffed behind the back 
when transported outside the jail (mostly to court). Prisoners routinely remained in those 
restraints for as many as twelve to fourteen hours, and many reported excruciating pain and 
sometimes injury from the protracted rear-cuffing. The city refused to modify the restraint 
procedures so the prisoners could be handcuffed in front or at their sides despite the lack of any 
apparent security need to rear-cuff. In addition, these restraint rules were applied to prisoners 
whose records of weapons use or possession were trivial (for example, an infirmary prisoner 
who defended himself with his crutch) or ancient (as long as eleven years in the past). PRP 
obtained several orders limiting the practice. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175 (2d 
Cir. 2001); Benjamin v. Fraser, No. 75 Civ. 3073, 2002 WL 31845111 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 
2002). While our appeal of the 2002 decision was pending, the city modified the procedure to 
eliminate rear-cuffing. 
 15. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 17. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). 
 18. Id. at 9–10. 
 19. Malicious and sadistic intent generally must be inferred from the circumstances and 
the actions of staff members. Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 708; Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 22 (2d Cir. 2000), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, and remanded by 103 F. App’x 434 (2004); Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 
1088 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc)) (holding that courts should consider the need for force, the 
relation between the need and the force used, the threat reasonably perceived, and efforts to 
temper the severity of response).  
 20. Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 505–06 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that more than de 
minimis force was used where an officer snapped the plaintiff’s head back in a towel, kicked 
him, and subjected him to racial abuse). 
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USE OF FORCE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS IN NEW YORK CITY  
Use of force in the New York City jails has been scrutinized in a 
series of class action lawsuits that we have brought challenging 
excessive force at particular jails or units. We have prevailed in all of 
those lawsuits, and staff violence has been significantly reduced in 
the jails subject to the resulting federal court orders. This experience 
conveys three significant lessons: the widespread use of violence is 
unnecessary to keep order in prison; prison force policies can be 
remedied without compromising prison safety and security; and that, 
even in light of these facts, it has taken external pressure, in the form 
of litigation, to achieve even localized reform in this large jail 
system. 
Our first challenge to excessive force concerned conditions in the 
“prison wards” of the New York City hospitals, where prisoners are 
housed when jails cannot meet their medical or mental health needs.21 
The case was settled with a consent judgment which resolved issues 
concerning the use of force, living conditions, and mental health and 
medical treatment within the wards.22 The consent judgment 
addressed the use of force problem for the population of prisoners 
afflicted with mental illness by restricting the correctional staff to 
security duties and removing them from their service and escort 
responsibilities within the wards.23 Additionally, the consent 
judgment required officers to be screened personally by the 
respective wards’ commanding officer before assignment and 
excluded officers with pending disciplinary charges or recent 
administrative discipline related to the use of force.24 Complaints of 
excessive force from the prison wards declined drastically as a result 
of this consent judgment. 
A subsequent challenge, in Fisher v. Koehler, addressed both 
excessive force by staff and violence among inmates at the jail for 
sentenced misdemeanants on Rikers Island.25 Despite the low-
 
 21. Reynolds v. Sielaff, No. 81 Civ. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 22. Order and Consent Judgment Approving Class Action Settlement, Reynolds v. Sielaff, 
No. 81 Civ. 101 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1990). 
 23. Id. paras. 43–44. 
 24. Id. paras. 43–48.  
 25. Fisher v. Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), injunction entered, 718 F. 
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security population, violence was so prevalent that the court found 
that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment: “Systematic deficiencies in the operation of 
CIFM . . . have led to a world where inmates suffer physical abuse, 
both by other inmates and by staff, in a chillingly routine and random 
fashion.”26 The court found a recurrent pattern of  
1) use of force out of frustration in response to offensive but 
non-dangerous inmate goading; 2) officers’ use of excessive 
force as a means of obtaining obedience and keeping order; 
3) force used as a first resort in reaction to any inmate behavior 
that might possibly be interpreted as aggressive; and 4) serious 
examples of excessive force by emergency response teams.27 
It concluded that the jail’s “failure to guide and train its officers in 
the correct use of force and its failure to monitor, investigate and 
discipline misuse of force have allowed—and indeed even made 
inevitable—an unacceptably high rate of misuse of force by staff on 
inmates.”28 The court ordered the agency to reform their written 
policies regarding use of force, training, investigation of uses of 
force, and discipline of staff members found to have used excessive 
or unnecessary force.29 Several years later, jail records showed that 
uses of force by staff had declined to about one-third of the per capita 
level demonstrated at the time of trial.30  
During the same period as Fisher, we brought a challenge against 
the use of excessive force in the Brooklyn House of Detention in 
Jackson v. Freckleton.31 After Fisher was resolved, Jackson was 
settled on terms similar to Fisher with the added requirement of 
installing video cameras in the jail’s intake area, where the brutality 
 
Supp. 1111 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 902 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 26. Id. at 1521. 
 27. Id. at 1538. 
 28. Id. at 1558. 
 29. See Fisher, 718 F. Supp. at 1113. 
 30. This analysis, performed under my supervision and on file with the Prisoners’ Rights 
Project, reviewed jail records produced pursuant to the court’s injunction as compared to the 
records admitted in evidence at trial to show the prevalence of use of force.  
 31. Jackson v. Freckleton, CV 85-2384 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1991). 
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had been concentrated.32 Following Jackson, complaints of misuse of 
force to PRP also diminished drastically. 
These three cases proved the feasibility and effectiveness of 
specific measures that could reduce staff violence. Unfortunately, the 
Department of Correction did not roll out system-wide reform; it 
quarantined it. At the other jails, the Department failed to hold 
supervisors accountable unlike those under court scrutiny. They 
ignored the obvious proposition that where cameras were installed 
prisoners rarely were beaten. They refused to reform their system of 
investigating and reporting even after a court had found it contributed 
to a pattern of unconstitutional misuse of force.33 Most significantly, 
the Department turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to the fact that 
scores of prisoners were being severely injured in “use of force 
applications” in which the necessity of such force was questionable at 
best. 
We continued to receive numerous complaints of staff assaults by 
staff, many involving serious injuries. These complaints were 
especially prevalent at the Central Punitive Segregation Unit (CPSU) 
on Rikers Island, this site of our next class action, Sheppard v. 
Phoenix.34 That unit, created in 1988 to house all adult male prisoners 
subject to discipline, was staffed by officers who were recruited 
directly from the Training Academy without any prior jail 
experience.35 We documented a well-organized culture of systematic 
staff violence and intimidation in the unit, which was fostered by 
years of supervisory neglect and encouragement.36 Both the pattern of 
brutality and many of the individual complaints were so extreme37 
 
 32. Order Approving Stipulation of Settlement and Entry as Consent Judgment at para. 
16, Jackson v. Freckleton, CV 85-2384 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1991). 
 33. See Fisher, 692 F. Supp. at 1558. 
 34. 210 F. Supp. 2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  
 35. We later learned that officers were selected for the unit based on their imposing size. 
Declaration of Plaintiff’s Counsel, Jonathan S. Chasan at para. 24, Sheppard v. Phoenix, No. 91 
Civ. 4148 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1998). 
 36. See id. 
 37. The brutal, out of control behavior of CPSU staff at this time is illustrated by evidence 
of “greeting beatings,” administered on intake to prisoners being disciplined for altercations 
with staff; the use of “throw down” weapons by some corrections staff to help fabricate 
justifications for their uses of force; officers striking each other in the face to create visible 
minor injuries that would support their cover stories of being attacked by prisoners; the practice 
of taking prisoners to isolated areas such as stairwells so they could be beaten without witnesses 
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that the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York, in cooperation with the Bronx District Attorney’s Office and 
the city’s Department of Investigation, brought a number of criminal 
prosecutions against officers, some resulting in prison sentences.38 
Unfortunately, the pattern of abuse we exposed and then helped to 
reform in the CPSU was far from unique.39 
In Sheppard we reached an agreement on how to curb violence in 
the CPSU by entering into a consent judgment, on the eve of trial, 
addressing the city’s use of force policies regarding training, 
supervision, investigation, and staff discipline, as well as the 
administration of the segregation unit.40 The widespread installation 
of recording video cameras in the unit was a critical part of these 
reforms. Initially, there was considerable resistance to the 
implementation of the reforms, stemming largely from lack of 
supervisory diligence. A four-year process of judicial supervision 
with the assistance of two “joint expert consultants” was necessary in 
 
(sometimes after calling an activity such as recreation and letting the target prisoner out of his 
cell last so he could be isolated easily); holding inmates’ heads in toilet bowls and flushing the 
toilets; making prisoners who entered the unit with tobacco, which was contraband, eat their 
cigarettes; and fights between inmates staged by staff members and referred to as “cockfights.” 
Chasan, supra note 36, paras. 31–33, 39, 42. 
 When some video cameras were installed, they were repeatedly turned away to face walls 
and ceilings. Id. para. 71. The warden overseeing the CPSU admitted that staff brutality was 
“ingrained in the culture” of the Department of Correction and was “part of the overall 
operations of the jail.” Id. para. 47.  
 38. Ex-Guard Is Sentenced in Beating at Rikers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1997, at 27 (noting 
two officers sent to prison); Dan Janison, Rikers Guards Are Acquitted, NEWSDAY, May 7, 
1998, at A32 (noting five convictions and seven acquittals). 
 39. For example, in United States v. Donnelly, 370 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2004), in which a 
correction officer was sentenced to prison for crimes including conspiracy to violate the civil 
rights of detainees, it was documented that he and other officers and supervisors “had an 
unwritten agreement to use unjustified, excessive force to punish detainees who ‘disrespected’ 
the officers, ‘put hands’ on the officers, or otherwise misbehaved. The agreement led to the use 
of excessive force in order ‘to teach the inmates a lesson.’” Id. at 89. Similarly, in the federal 
prison at Florence, Colorado, a gang of prison staff members who called themselves “the 
Cowboys” operated for several years, assaulting prisoners they considered to be disciplinary 
problems and fabricating cover stories to justify their actions. See Turner v. Schultz, 187 F. 
Supp. 2d 1288, 1290 (D. Colo. 2002) (noting several indictments and two guilty pleas arising 
from the activities of the Cowboys); see also Jennifer Hamilton, Three Former Federal Prison 
Guards in Colorado Convicted in Inmate Beatings, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 25, 2003 (noting 
subsequent convictions at trial). 
 40. Stipulation of Settlement, Sheppard v. Phoenix, No. 91 Civ. 4148 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 
1998); see also Sheppard v. Phoenix, No. 91 Civ. 4148, 1998 WL 397846 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 
1998). 
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order to ensure that the settlement was carried out.41 When this 
agreement was implemented, the use of injurious force against 
prisoners plummeted, as did the frequency of injuries to correctional 
staff.42 The court terminated its involvement on the ground that it was 
no longer necessary.43 
Once more, despite the success of the settlement and the extensive 
experience gained from its implementation, the Department of 
Correction did not extend the newly implemented remedial 
measures—the use of video cameras, investigative protocols, training 
of investigators, and greater supervisory diligence—beyond the 
segregation unit. Complaints to PRP of serious physical abuse of 
prisoners by staff continued unabated. As a result, PRP, in 
conjunction with the law firms of Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady 
LLP and Sullivan & Cromwell, P.C., filed a new lawsuit addressing 
the continued excessive force in all the New York City jails which 
had not already been the subject of court orders.44 This case sought 
damages for the twenty-two named plaintiffs (who sustained injuries 
at the hands of correctional staff, including broken bones, facial 
lacerations, internal injuries, and a ruptured eyeball) and injunctive 
relief for the class of jail prisoners.45  
 
 41. Sheppard v. Phoenix, 210 F. Supp. 2d 450, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The joint expert 
consultants—Norman Carlson, former director of the federal Bureau of Prisons, and Steve J. 
Martin, a former official of the Texas Department of Corrections—served a function 
comparable to that of a special master or court monitor. Id. at 452–53. 
 42. Id. at 458. 
 43. Id. at 460. From 1997 (the last year before the settlement) to 2001 the number of more 
serious and injurious use of force incidents decreased from 177 to 15. Id. at 458. While we 
believe that this decrease was exaggerated to some degree by inconsistent classification 
practices, the reduction in injurious force was nonetheless enormous. (The overall number of 
reported uses of force increased rather than declining, which we believe reflects an 
improvement in record-keeping; before the settlement, many less serious uses of force were not 
reported at all despite the jail system’s rules.) The drastic drop in injurious force is reflected in 
the fact that the number of prisoners taken to hospitals from the CPSU decreased from 136 in 
1997 to 26 in 2001, and the number of workers’ compensation claims by CPSU staff fell from 
341 in 1998 to 129 in 2001. Id. at 459. 
 44. Ingles v. Toro, No. 01 Civ. 8279, 2003 WL 402565 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2003).  
 45. See id. (certifying case as a class action); Fourth Amended Complaint, supra note 6. 
After these remarks were delivered, the City elected to settle the case in an agreement that 
provides, inter alia, for the installation of recording video cameras in numerous locations; 
revisions in the City’s written use of force policy; changes in use of force training; changes in 
training and in instructions to the staff who investigate use of force incidents; photographs of 
prisoners’ injuries taken shortly after use of force incidents; and a system for tracking officers’ 
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In the new litigation the plaintiffs’ expert consultant, Steve J. 
Martin, submitted a report, based on an extensive review of use of 
force reports and other documentation from the jails, and concluded 
that:  
 The number, extent and seriousness of inmate injuries, and 
the manner in which those injuries are sustained in individual 
applications of force by staff assigned to the commands that 
are the subject of this lawsuit, reflect a stark and obvious 
pattern of unnecessary and excessive force deliberately applied 
to inflict physical harm and pain rather than to immobilize, 
restrain or control non-compliant, disorderly, assaultive or 
fleeing inmates.46 
Similarly, a second plaintiffs’ expert consultant, Vincent M. Nathan, 
who had been involved in prior New York City use of force litigation 
(as had Mr. Martin), concluded: 
As I reviewed investigation files and other materials, I had a 
sense of bleak sameness to the practices I saw in earlier cases 
involving Rikers Island facilities.  
. . . .  
 . . . The scenarios I have observed are best described as 
fistfights between inmates and staff, sometimes initiated by 
inmates but often started by staff. These unprofessional brawls 
are not effective responses to aggression and they do not have 
the effect of controlling inmates’ behavior or of protecting 
staff or others.  
 . . . [U]se of force by staff in the jails at issue here often 
results in exceptionally serious injuries to inmates: significant 
facial bruising, broken bones (including broken noses and 
 
use of force. There are monitoring provisions that allow plaintiffs’ counsel to review relevant 
documents during the term of the agreement and to tour the jails to observe the placement and 
operation of the video cameras. The named plaintiffs’ damages claims were separately settled 
for amounts ranging from $15,000 to $575,000, totaling $2,213,000. Ingles v. Toro (Ingles 
2006), 438 F. Supp. 2d 203, 210 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 46. Report of Plaintiff’s Expert, Steve J. Martin at 9, Ingles v. Toro, No. 01 Civ. 8279 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2004). 
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jaws), perforated eardrums, facial lacerations requiring sutures, 
abrasions, bruises, and broken teeth. . . . [T]he nature of 
injuries to inmates and staff is not consistent with the use of 
physical force as a legitimate control measure in limited and 
dangerous circumstances.47 
KEEPING THE USE OF FORCE WITHIN LAWFUL BOUNDS 
The use of force can never be eliminated entirely, but prisons and 
jails can be managed with a minimal amount of physical force. We 
know that because we have seen it. Injury from staff violence has 
plummeted with no loss of administrative control in jails where we 
have brought and completed litigation, both in the low-security jail 
for misdemeanants and in the Rikers Island disciplinary unit, said by 
its managers to house “the worst of the worst.” 
Power tends to corrupt, and that tendency is extraordinarily strong 
when power is exercised behind prison walls and outside public 
scrutiny, and against people who are powerless and stigmatized, and 
who will generally not be listened to or believed when they complain. 
Controlling the use of force in jails and prisons therefore requires not 
only lawful policies on paper, but ongoing vigilance by correctional 
leadership to ensure that policies are followed. In controlling the 
misuse of force against prisoners there is no substitute for a genuine 
and attentive commitment by correctional administrators to operating 
the institutions with as little violence as possible. “Nod and wink” 
oversight by correctional managers (often “laundered” with a fake 
paper trail of pro forma staff reports and blind-eye supervisory 
review) is probably the deadliest enemy of efforts to control 
excessive force.  
Beyond the need for committed leadership there are specific and 
identifiable measures that can make a significant difference in 
controlling staff violence. 
 
 47. Report of Plaintiff’s Expert, Vincent M. Nathan at 7, 9–10, Ingles v. Toro, No. 01 Civ. 
8279 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2004). Mr. Nathan added: “In my 30 years of experience in the field 
of corrections, I have never seen a system in the 50 states more resistant to constitutional reform 
than the New York City Department of Correction.” Id. at 256. 
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First, staff must be held accountable. When force is misused the 
appropriate prison administrators must act to ensure that the 
offending staff members do not repeat their conduct and that other 
staff members understand that such conduct will not be tolerated. 
1. All uses of force must be reported and investigated. It is 
essential that prison administrators know the conduct of their staff 
with respect to the use of force. Unfortunately, there is a widespread 
pattern of failing to report uses of force or failing to report them 
accurately. Correction staff should be required to report and explain 
all instances in which they use force or are witnesses to the use of 
force. Supervisory staff should review such reports and investigate 
them independently by interviewing prisoners as well as staff 
members and by examining medical records and other available 
evidence to ensure that staff accounts are accurate. 
Ensuring the integrity of use of force investigations is easier said 
than done. There is a persistent tendency in jails and prisons to make 
excuses and to cover up for internal misconduct. The “blue wall of 
silence” is even thicker and higher in corrections than in police 
work.48 In our litigation, we have seen this tendency manifest in the 
 
 48. The existence of a code of silence among law enforcement personnel about their 
colleagues’ misconduct, long known informally to their critics, has been formally 
acknowledged with greater frequency in recent years. See, e.g., Baron v. Suffolk County 
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 402 F.3d 225, 237–43 (1st Cir. 2005) (affirming jury finding of municipal 
custom of condoning harassment to enforce the code of silence at the Suffolk County jail, 
noting that an official commission has urged “an aggressive attack on the code of silence”); 
Blair v. City of Pomona, 223 F.3d 1074, 1079–81 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting evidence about code 
of silence in Christopher Commission report about Los Angeles police practices); Jeffes v. 
Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 62–64 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding, similar to Blair, that evidence of 
widespread adherence to code of silence, the Sheriff’s embrace of it, and his encouragement of 
harassment of officers who violated it could support a finding of municipal policy); Skinner v. 
Uphoff, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1215–16 (D. Wyo. 2002) (holding that a code of silence 
concerning staff misconduct in connection with prison violence amounted to an 
unconstitutional, deliberate indifference to prisoners’ safety); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 
1146, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 1995), rev’d and remanded by, 150 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting “the 
undeniable presence of a ‘code of silence’ at [the] Pelican Bay [prison facility]. . . designed to 
encourage prison employees to remain silent regarding the improper behavior of their fellow 
employees, particularly where excessive force has been alleged. Those who defy the code risk 
retaliation and harassment.”); Klipfel v. Gonzales, No. 94 Civ. 6415, 2006 WL 1697009, at *11 
(N.D. Ill. June 8, 2006) (summarizing evidence of a code of silence within the Chicago Police 
Department); cf. Diesel v. Town of Lewisboro, 232 F.3d 92, 104 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming 
dismissal of suit by police officer complaining he was denied the benefit of the “blue wall of 
silence”). 
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investigative process in numerous ways. Investigators ignore 
discrepancies and implausibilities in staff statements while 
emphasizing and exaggerating those in prisoners’ statements. They 
apply a similar double standard to medical evidence depending on 
whether it supports or undermines staff accounts. They engage in 
speculation to make excuses for officers’ injurious actions or to 
discredit the statements of prisoners. They avoid resolving what is 
often thought of as the crucial issue: whether it was reasonable for the 
staff member to apply injurious force rather than restraining force or 
non-violent measures. 
2. Recording video cameras should be widely used in areas and 
on occasions where the use of force tends to occur. Videotaping uses 
of force is an enormously beneficial practice. It protects prisoners 
against misuse of force and staff members against false accusations 
of excessive force.49 It assists in resolving difficult factual disputes. 
The only losers are those who wish to break the rules and get away 
with it. It is our view that the widespread installation of video 
cameras in the Rikers Island Central Punitive Segregation Unit has 
done as much as any other measure to curb the extreme pattern of 
excessive force that used to exist in that unit. 
3. Meaningful disciplinary action must be taken against staff 
who misuse force, without exception. Over the years we have noted 
an extraordinary reluctance by supervisors to take significant 
disciplinary action, even when staff have been identified as engaging 
in excessive force. Some disciplinary prosecutions have been 
inexplicably delayed. They are often dismissed (“administratively 
filed” in New York City jargon) for any available reason (sometimes 
because of the inexplicable delays), or they are settled for trivial 
disciplinary sanctions. Convincing the Department of Correction to 
promulgate a “penalty grid” of appropriate sanctions was the most 
difficult and long-delayed aspect of implementing the settlement in 
the Sheppard case, discussed above. 
4. Misconduct related to misuse of force by staff must be 
investigated and, if warranted, meaningful disciplinary action must be 
 
 49. See Skinner v. Cunningham, 430 F.3d 483 (1st Cir. 2005) (absolving officers of 
constitutional violations based largely on the court’s review of videotape of the use of force 
incident).  
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taken. The misuse of force is frequently associated with other forms 
of staff misconduct. If an officer uses excessive force and reports the 
incident falsely, it is likely that other staff members who witnessed 
the event have also submitted false reports. Strong disciplinary action 
for false reporting by staff witnesses is absolutely essential to curb 
excessive force; it is reliance on the code of silence, complicity, and 
outright dishonesty that embolden staff members to engage in 
physical abuse. Similarly, in some instances, especially those 
involving after-the-fact reprisals against prisoners whom staff believe 
have acted disruptively or disrespectfully, officers leave their 
assigned posts to participate in physical abuse and do not report their 
unauthorized presence. In other cases, officers fail to arrange for 
medical examinations of prisoners involved in uses of force or even 
intimidate them and other prisoner-witnesses from reporting the 
events. Prison authorities must be as intolerant of this collateral 
misconduct as it is a direct abuse of prisoners. 
5. The adequacy of disciplinary prosecutions must be ensured. 
In most jurisdictions staff accused of misconduct have procedural 
protections under civil service law and/or union contracts, as they 
should. Correctional administrators who wish to discipline staff for 
misuse of force must be prepared to prove their cases and must 
devote the necessary resources and attention to do so competently.50 
This is a core law enforcement function, and it should be staffed and 
organized as such. 
Second, correctional staff must be protected. Some prison staff 
use excessive or unnecessary force because they are not confident 
that they can maintain order and protect themselves in any other way. 
It is the job of prison administrators and the governments that employ 
them to give their line staff the confidence and tools they need to 
ensure that their jobs are manageable.  
1. Overcrowding must be avoided. Crowding in prisons 
increases the levels of stress and tension, and overloads basic services 
and facilities (like food, medical care, and access to showers and 
 
 50. There has been a recurrent failure to do so in New York City. In one recent case, 
where PRP was consulted because we had made the initial complaint and subsequently brought 
suit on behalf of the prisoner, the administrative prosecutor did not interview the affected 
prisoner or his witnesses until the day before the hearing. 
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toilets), causing increased prisoner stress. In that situation officers 
may become the targets of prisoner hostility and, in turn, may 
perceive a necessity to use force to maintain order. Additionally, 
prisons and housing units holding prisoners above their respective 
capacities are much more difficult to monitor, manage, and keep 
orderly, and officers themselves may become excessively stressed 
and simply lose control in overcrowded settings. 
2. Prisoners must be classified effectively. Some prisoners are 
simply more difficult to manage than others, and it is generally not 
hard to determine who they are from their prison disciplinary 
histories as well as, to some degree, from their criminal records. 
Separating more aggressive prisoners from more passive prisoners 
and housing the former in areas which are designed for more 
stringent control and supervision will give staff a more manageable 
job to do and better tools for maintaining control.  
3. Reliable services must be provided. Many staff-prisoner 
disputes arise from failures of the services necessary in institutional 
life such as food, medical care, delivery of mail, escorts, and visits. 
Often these events are beyond the control of line staff. In others, line 
staff purposefully interfere with the delivery of services as a covert 
disciplinary measure, often referred to as putting prisoners “on the 
burn.” In either case, such failures unnecessarily increase tensions 
and multiply confrontations. This danger is particularly great in 
segregation units, where prisoners are confined to their cells almost 
all day. During the implementation of the consent judgment in our 
CPSU litigation, we found that interruptions of necessary services 
accounted for a large share of staff-officer confrontations, and that 
intervention by higher departmental authority to end those 
interruptions went a long way toward bringing peace to that troubled 
unit. 
4. Staff must be trained adequately. We have been struck by 
how frequently officers say that they remember little or nothing about 
their use of force training. In particular, they express little confidence 
in the non-injurious use of force techniques taught in training. In the 
CPSU litigation, at Legal Aid’s request, the consent judgment 
required that officers be required to re-qualify in non-injurious 
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techniques on an annual basis,51 just as they are required annually to 
demonstrate proficiency in the use of firearms. 
5. Supervisory back-up must be readily available to defuse 
staff-prisoner confrontations. Many use of force incidents arise from 
arguments in which prisoners or staff, or both, lose their tempers and 
self-control. Such confrontations can often be defused by intervention 
of a supervisory officer. Supervisors should not have a span of 
control so large that they cannot respond promptly to requests for 
such intervention, and it should be clear that it is part of their job to 
do so. 
Third, there must be effective external oversight. Prisons and jails 
rarely reform themselves. Law enforcement agencies expend 
immense effort to rationalize, justify, or cover up misdeeds. The code 
of silence is even more difficult to defeat in prisons than in police 
agencies, since the actions of prison staff take place behind walls and 
bars out of the view of neutral civilian witnesses. There is little 
political support for actions that may be viewed as coddling criminals 
and there are many obstacles to taking effective action against law 
enforcement personnel who abuse their powers, making reform a 
difficult task. Usually the impetus for reform comes from outside the 
institution, often as a result of bloody and widely publicized disasters 
on a large or small scale. Frequently, as in New York, external 
intervention comes in the form of litigation, which (as even we who 
make our living at it agree) is an extremely blunt instrument for 
reforming complex institutions.  
What is needed to control excessive force in prisons and jails is an 
ongoing review of the treatment of prisoners by independent 
agencies, both structurally and in fact; of the prison chain of 
command,52 with full access to information and testimony; and the 
 
 51. Stipulation of Settlement at para. 29, Sheppard v. Phoenix, No. 91 Civ. 4148 
(S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1998). A similar requirement appears in the more recent settlement 
agreement in Legal Aid’s city-wide use of force class action Ingles v. Toro, 438 F. Supp. 2d 
203, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (summarizing this settlement). 
 52. I make this point advisedly, since there are agencies of New York State and the New 
York City government that are nominally independent but engage in no meaningful review of 
prisoners’ complaints of abuse. For instance, the New York State Commission of Correction 
does not entertain complaints by prisoners or about prisoners’ treatment; it merely refers the 
prisoners back to prison authorities. The sole exception is that the Commission of Correction 
reviews the circumstances surrounding prison deaths when they occur, which is valuable, 
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power of independent fact-finding and action. If this discussion 
sounds familiar, it is. It is the same argument that has been made, 
against bitter resistance, for civilian review of citizen complaints 
against the police. The need for such review is even greater for 
complaints of abuse committed out of sight and out of the public 
mind in prisons and jails. 
 
though these reviews are not released publicly in their entirety, and the Commission has no 
power to enforce any recommendations it may make. The New York City Board of Correction, 
which nominally has regulatory power over the city jails, sometimes intervenes informally to 
call egregious incidents to the attention of higher authorities in the jail system, but has played 
no formal role in investigating and fact-finding with respect to claims of physical abuse of 
prisoners. 
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